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Abstract 
The state of insecurity occasioned by fraudulent practices in Africa has been of concern economically, both at home and 
abroad. In this paper, we propose ways to mitigate this problem, using Nigeria as a case study. Based on surveys in West 
Africa, the paper examines the security situation in the continent and its mutual impacts with computerisation, 
miniaturisation and Location-Based Authentication (LBA). It was discovered that computerisation and miniaturisation had 
negative effects on cyber-security, as these were being exploited by fraudsters, using advance fee fraud; called 419. As a 
countermeasure, the paper examines the possibility of using LBA and digitisation of the GSM Mobile country codes down 
to city/area codes along with GSM/GPS authentications. These could also be combined with the use of a web-based Secret 
Sharing Scheme for services with very high security demands. The challenges of roaming were also examined and 
considered to be of negligible impact. 
Keywords: cyber space, computerisation, miniaturisation, authentication, advance fee fraud (419), digitisation and tele-density. 
 
                                                          
*
 M.I. Adeka, miadeka@student.bradford.ac.uk 
1. Introduction 
The degree of cyber-related insecurity occasioned by 
fraudulent practices in Africa has been an issue of great 
concern economically, especially as it relates to foreign 
direct investments and dealings with other international 
partners. Apart from the economic costs to the nations, 
corporate organisations and individuals, it has also dented 
the image of some of the countries in various international 
fora. This motivation of this paper is an effort to find ways 
of using technology to mitigate the negative effects of this 
state of insecurity. Although the study samples have been 
drawn from the West African community, specifically, using 
Nigeria as a case study, the results are applicable to all 
countries with similar situations. 
    Based on surveys involving two field trips to Nigeria and 
the knowledge acquired via the implementation of 
CDRSAS-PT (Cloud Data Repository Secure Access 
Service - Prototype; a recently-completed PhD Research 
Project [1]), among other resources, this paper begins by 
examining the general security situation in the regional 
environment, with a focus on cyber-security, especially as it 
relates to the use of Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM). We then give some basic 
clarifications of some relevant concepts, including cyber 
space, computerisation, miniaturisation, Location Based 
Authentication (LBA), advance fee fraud (419), digitisation 
and tele-density, as they affect the sub-Saharan nations, with 
Nigeria as the hub of activities. In Section 3, both the 
forward and backward effects of these technological 
developments are then assessed vis-a-vis the national 
security posture with a focus on the security of cyber space. 
In Section 4, the discussions on identifiable measures aimed 
at mitigating possible security threats in the system are 
presented. These include the possibility of using LBA and 
further digitisation of the GSM Mobile country codes down 
to City/Area codes along with GSM Mobile/Global 
Positioning System (GPS) authentications. Where necessary, 
these could be combined with the use of a web-based Secret 
Sharing Scheme for services with very high security 
demands. Possible challenges to the suggested mitigating 
measures would also be considered in Section 5 with the 
conclusion following in Section 6.  
 
 
 
 M.I. Adeka, K.O.O. Anoh, M. Ngala, S.J. Shepherd, E. Ibrahim,  I. Elfergani, A.S. Hussaini, F. Elmegri and R.A. Abd-Alhameed 
2 
2. Basic conceptual clarifications 
The term cyberspace does not have a standard and objective 
definition [2]. Generally, it is used to describe the virtual 
world of computers. In other words, while the term ‘cyber’ 
denotes the computer and anything that relates to it, 
cyberspace refers to the notional environment in which 
communications over computer networks occur [3]. It is 
“the domain characterized by the use of electronics and the 
electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange 
data via networked systems and associated physical 
infrastructure” [1]. On the other hand, computerisation is to 
cause certain operations or processes to be performed by a 
computer, particularly, as a replacement for human labour. 
Digitisation is the process of converting real-world analogue 
quantities (texts, images, audio, video, etc.) into a digital 
format [4]. In this format, information is organised into 
discrete small units of data (bits) which are grouped into 
bytes. This is the binary data that computers and several 
devices with computing capacity can process. Thus, 
digitisation involves a process that results in the breaking 
down of a given whole into its smaller parts. 
Miniaturisation is the continuous reduction in the sizes of 
manufactured items, regardless of whether they are 
mechanical, optical or electronic products and devices; e.g., 
mobile phones, computers, vehicle engine downsizing, etc. 
[5]. This trend is made possible by the emergence of micro 
and nano technologies. Authentication is the process of 
establishing the true identity of a user or an entity [6]. Thus, 
LBA is a form of authentication where the identification 
factor is related to the physical location of the user/entity. 
Tele-density used to be computed as the number of fixed 
telephone lines per hundred inhabitants. With the advent of 
GSM, where mobile cellular subscribers outnumber the 
fixed line connections in some countries, the term Mobi-
density is preferred in such countries; i.e., mobile cellular 
subscribers per hundred inhabitants. Since the two terms 
may lead to mutual disadvantages for countries with well-
established fixed lines and those whose GSM network is still 
at the initial stage of development. ITU has proposed the use 
of Effective Tele-density; defined as either fixed line 
connections or mobile subscribers per hundred inhabitants – 
whichever of the two is higher [7], [8]. 
    Advance fee fraud (alias 419), which is also known as the 
Nigerian Scam, has grown into an epidemic [9]. The term 
‘419’ was coined from Section 419 of the Nigerian Criminal 
Code (part of Chapter 38: Obtaining Property by False 
Pretences; Cheating) [10]. Basically, 419 is a form of 
confidence trick which the confidence artists use to defraud 
unassuming innocent business partners, both locally and 
abroad. An example of a 419-transaction is illustrated in 
Figure 1, where Caller 2 (Location B; Lagos) gives his fake 
location as Kano (Location E) in his mobile phone 
conversation with Caller 1 (Location A; Ibadan); while he is 
actually speaking from Lagos. Please note that Caller 2 
could have given his fake location as Locations C (Kumasi 
in Ghana) or D (Niamey in Niger), claiming to have roamed 
his mobile service. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A 419 mobile phone conversation: giving a 
fake caller’s location 
 
3. The state of cyber insecurity in Africa, using 
Nigeria as a case study 
 
Every society has its bad eggs; research estimates show that 
about 4% of Nigerians engage in cybercrimes [11]. It is 
clear from the magnitude of this percentage that, the 419 
fraud is a major concern, not only for African Governments 
and their citizens, but the entire global community [10]. 
     Cybercrime refers to any unlawful act perpetrated using 
the computer, electronics and ancillary devices as tools 
within the cyberspace [12]. It involves disruption of network 
traffic along with virtually an endless list of major and 
sundry crimes including terrorism and outright warfare [3]. 
It targets individuals, individual properties, corporate 
organisations, governments, the entire nation and the global 
community at large [3, 12]. Discussions with and statistics 
from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC), Abuja, and the Special Fraud Unit (SFU) of the 
Nigeria Police, Lagos, Nigeria, indicate that cybercrimes 
that are prevalent in Nigeria include [13, 14]: fishing and 
spoofing activities targeting bank customers; skimming of 
standard issue magnetic-stripe ATM (Automated Teller 
Machine) cards; cloning and/or defacing of government and 
business websites; spamming activities involving 419 
solicitations (for lottery, inheritance, charity, romance, crude 
oil, fund transfer, employment, contracts, etc.); fraudulent 
online purchases from e-commerce sites made with fake 
foreign financial instruments and stolen credit card 
information; online investment scams targeting local 
victims; deployment of malicious programmes – mostly off-
the-shelf spyware, key stroke loggers, Trojans and extractors 
on target systems; targeting of emotionally vulnerable 
persons on free social networking sites; and the use of free 
email services (especially g-mail, yahoo-mail and hotmail) 
in cybercrime related communications.  
     Cybercrimes are very common in Nigeria but they could 
appear elsewhere. Statistics reveal that these crimes are 
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mostly committed by males between the ages of 20–35, and 
mostly based in University towns [13]. Nigeria currently 
ranks first in Africa, and third in the world, after the US and 
UK, with 5.7% cybercrime perpetrators (down by 0.2% 
from 2006), as illustrated in Table 1 [12].  
 
 Table 1. Top Ten Countries by Count  
          (Cybercrime Perpetrators)  
 
Country Percentage 
1. United States  
2. United Kingdom  
3. Nigeria  
4. Canada  
5. Romania  
6. Italy   
7. Spain  
8. South Africa   
9. Russia   
10. Ghana  
63.2% 
15.3% 
5.7% 
5.6% 
1.5% 
1.3% 
 0.9% 
0.9% 
0.8% 
0.7% 
 
Source: Internet Crime Report 2007 
 
 
Table 2. Cyber Fraudulent Crime Statistics in Nigeria 
(EFCC/NFIU) - 2012 – 2014 
 
Year Description Quantity 
2012 No of Cases Reported   
No of Suspects Arrested 
Financial Recoveries (Naira) 
89 
100 
2.4 Billion 
2013 No of Cases Reported    
No of Suspects Arrested 
Financial Recoveries (Naira)
   
99 
188 
8.4 Billion 
2014* No of Cases Reported 
No of Suspects Arrested 
Financial Recoveries (Naira) 
 
93 
- 
630 Million 
Source: Nigeria Police (SFU) and EFCC Crime 
Statistics 2014
*
  … For the First Quarter Only 
 
From Table 2, all the indices for the incidence of cybercrime 
in Nigeria are on the increase for the three years shown; 
some astronomically, bearing in mind that the indicators for 
2014 are incomplete. Virtually all researchers agree that 
globalization occasioned by the revolution in Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) has greatly 
contributed to the rise in cybercrimes globally. However, 
this does not explain why Nigeria should be far ahead of 
South Africa, for instance, with 5.7% against 0.9%, given 
that the Internet users in South Africa are more than 50% of 
their Nigerian counterparts: about 26.5% of Nigerians use 
the Internet, giving about 45million Internet users; South 
Africa has about 48.9% of its population on the net, yielding 
about 23.6 million users [15]. Many researchers agree that it 
is the Nigerian 419 Scam that has sharply differentiated her 
from South Africa, and this was enhanced by 
miniaturization of communication devices among other 
factors, especially the mobile phone which is very portable 
and more amenable to deception in respect of callers’ geo-
location information [10 - 13]. 
     The implication of this finding can be fully appreciated 
only if it is realized that, the annual statistics for mobile 
phone subscribers in Nigeria indicates a leap from 266,46 to 
135,253,599 between 2001 and 2012, respectively. The 
effective tele-density for the corresponding periods also 
witnessed a quantum leap from 0.73 to 80.85 respectively 
[16]. Nigerian Governments have been fighting fraudulent 
crimes for a long time without much result. This led to the 
establishment of various outfits, in addition to the Nigerian 
Criminal Code Act. Thus, it could be said that while 
globalization has enhanced the socio-economic life of the 
people, it has also come along with insecurity problems that 
have so far defied solutions.  
 
 
4. Countering feigned-location fraud 
related crimes in Nigeria 
It is noteworthy that most of the measures so far employed 
in Nigeria to counter the cyber and other fraud-related 
crimes are mostly based on legal instruments; in terms of 
enactments and enforcements. Since the most valuable tool 
for the 419 fraudsters is the mobile phone, it seems 
reasonable to approach the problem from a technological 
angle as one of the most promising ways forward. It is 
hereby proposed that location-based authentication be 
employed in two versions in Nigeria. While one version is to 
actually detect the exact physical location of the fraudster, 
the other is to deter him/her from committing the crime. For 
actual detection, there would be need to make all 
transceivers GPS-compliant, with inherent capabilities for 
location-based mutual authentication as advocated in [6]. 
This would be able to detect the locations of both static and 
mobile cyber criminals; please note that a mobile phone is 
being treated here as a computer – smart phones are 
computers with phone capabilities.  The deterrence approach 
would be realised by a further digitisation of the country 
codes for the GSM cellular phone systems, as explained in 
the next section. This could be very effective against 419 
fraudsters who use the mobile phone as their main tool. 
Where necessary, the two approaches could be combined 
with the use of a modified web-based secret sharing scheme 
for services with very high security demands. 
4.1 Background to the deterrence approach 
In the evolution of cellular phones, one major reason for 
dropping certain standards stemmed from security 
limitations and incompatibility of diverse standards. 
Researches were motivated to solve this challenge. 
Breakthroughs yielded the Long Term Evolution (LTE) 
today [17, 18].  Since then, subsequent cellular standards 
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have become more mobile, secure and compatible with 
earlier standards across different national boundaries. Aside 
from these improvements, security challenges still abound 
such as location identification of a mobile user. Recently, 
the 3GPP working group proposed the inclusion of the Time 
Difference of Arrival (TDOA) algorithm [19] in the LTE-
Advanced (LTE-A) Release 10 and beyond (which has been 
revised to inherit Rel-8/9 features) to identify the location of 
a mobile caller [20, 21]. In cellular phone networks, 
although the term Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-
OTD) is often used instead of TDOA, the principle is the 
same [6], except that the former involves the broadcast of 
cell-ID [21]. 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
 
 
(c) (d) 
Figure 2.  Hierarchical Structure of Cellular Network: 
(a) Base Station (BS) for a Cell; (b) A 7-Cell Cluster; 
(c) Cell Splitting; and (d) Cellular Network Structure 
 
    In contrast to mobile phones, fixed telephones are more 
secure and mostly preferred in official involvements, since it 
is more accurately traceable. Its address can be easily found 
since the address (including the city codes) assigned to a 
user is known. This feature makes it more dependable to 
transact businesses using fixed telephones than mobile 
phones. This proposal considers mapping the security 
advantage of the fixed telephones on to the mobiles (with a 
variety of modifications) such that it can be more 
dependable in this respect. Of course, most business 
organizations would benefit should the mobile lines provide 
equivalent levels of security to fixed lines. 
     In the meantime, area codes are known to be common 
and are defined differently for different countries [22,23]; 
e.g., three digits for USA, Canada and Nigeria, two digits 
for Brazil and one digit for Australia and New Zeeland. We 
also have variable lengths for United Kingdom, Germany, 
Austria, etc. Sometimes, and in some countries also, these 
area codes are part of caller’s mobile number. It is hoped 
that another variety can be exploited that would travel with 
the permanent caller mobile number. It is possible that this 
research may revolutionize area/city coding for mobile 
nodes and that the security breaches volunteered by the 
cellular telecommunication security orifice will be solved 
permanently, within the context of current technology.  
     This proposal does not suggest any change in the 
numbering plan or hardware of any telecommunication 
network operator, but integration into the software 
configuration of the radio routing elements of the network 
operator’s systems – base station (Node-B, evolved-Node B 
or Home-eNB). It does not affect the traditional design of 
the mobile handsets nor would the handsets be reconfigured 
for the purpose. 
 
4.2 Benefits to the Country 
From experience, the duo of location-based identification 
and mobility has always been a confidence-inspiring pair of 
factors for criminals; the mobile communication technology 
is no exception. This is because prompt identification of the 
geographical position of the mobile phone users is still a 
technology challenge, which is consequent upon mobility 
and positioning. Most crimes in Africa are therefore aided 
and/or perpetrated using mobile phones. Such crimes 
include kidnapping, robbery, impersonation, terrorism and 
all shades of ‘419’. Sometimes, family members 
masquerade to defraud own family. Debtors pretend to abide 
in Abuja while in Lagos. The ban on the use of 
GSM/Thuraya services in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States 
in the wake of the State of Emergency (SoE) declared in 
May 2013 (Nigeria), is a robust illustration of the argument 
being canvased in support of this proposal. Hence, this 
proposal means a solution for reducing the tendency to 
commit the crimes associated with the use of mobile phones 
to enhance confidence in the committing of such crimes in 
the country. It is instructive to note that the deterrence effect 
of the technological solution envisaged in the proposal, is 
even more than its enhancements in tracking down the 
criminals with a view to subjecting them to justice. This 
proposal would be an obituary for ‘419 and Associates,’ not 
only in Africa, but the world at large. 
 
4.3 The proposed technology 
 
In the meantime, a mobile phone caller can be traced to the 
country of origin using the country calling code. It makes it 
very possible that fraudulent activities can thrive since the 
exact location of the mobile caller cannot be estimated by 
the ordinary users. In LTE-A Release 10 and beyond, 
mobile phones are proposed to incorporate the TDOA in 
determining the location of the mobile caller [20, 21]. This 
tracking functionality permits that only the network 
operators  and/or the security agencies such as the police 
would be able to trace the origin of a mobile caller, 
depending on the TDOA parameters [19] extracted from the 
caller. It can be reasoned that this still makes the acquisition 
of the space-time information of a mobile caller vague, 
perilous, tedious, and expensive. The proximity of a caller’s 
* 
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location characteristics to the parameters extracted from the 
TDOA algorithm cannot define the position of a caller 
closer than 10 meters. In addition, the time it takes to 
compute and then trace the origin of the caller can as well 
leverage fraud. The proposed initiative can be combined 
with the TDOA to improve the identification of a mobile 
user’s geographical location faster. In fact, at least four cells 
are required to perform Observed Time Difference of 
Arrival (OTDOA) [19,24], and the disadvantages cannot be 
overstressed. 
    Just like the landlines wherein a caller location can be 
easily identified, a similar situation is being advocated for a 
mobile user. This could be achieved by a further digitisation 
of the GSM country code into city/area codes. Thus, the 
caller ID travels with the city/area codes as well, instead of 
country code alone. With proper public awareness 
education, it would become clear to all users that such 
phones could no longer be safely used in defrauding people 
by falsifying the city location of the caller. The exact city 
location can be extended to a mobile phone user to reduce 
and also discourage fraudulent activities among mobile 
phone users.  The city/area codes will be incorporated in the 
base stations within an area. Each base station will bear a 
code of the area within which it is domiciled; i.e., its cell, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. The radio signal originating from 
such base stations will be routed with city/area code 
parameters to disclose the origin of a call via the Cell of 
Origin (COO). Further binning of the available area codes, 
as  defined by the Nigerian Communications Commission 
(NCC) [22], like in the case of USA [25], can be made to 
ensure discrete proximity to the COO of a mobile phone 
radio information. Thus, for each call placed by a user, the 
trunk prefix in the trunk code [22] (i.e. the ‘0’ in ‘043’ of 
043-805123456, for example) will remain, but the trunk 
code will be modified to characterise the discrete area in the 
city from where a call originated. 
The hierarchical structure of a cellular network is 
illustrated in Figure 2 [45]. The structure is formed by 
connecting the major components like mobile phones, Base 
stations (BS) and Mobile Switching Centres (MSC). The BS 
serves a cell which could be a few kilometres in diameter as 
shown in Figure 2 (a); instead of using a circle to depict an 
ideal situation, the hexagon is used for convenience. When 
the cells are grouped together, they form a Cluster as shown 
in Figure 2 (b). Usually, the number of cells in a cluster is 
limited by the requirement that the clusters must fit together 
like jig-saw pieces. The possible cell clusters are the 4-,7-, 
12- and 21-cell clusters [45]. The size of a cell can be 
changed or reduced by splitting the original cell. Figure 2 (c) 
illustrates how a cell can be split into four; this involves 
reducing the radius of the original cell by half [45]. As 
illustrated in Figure 2 (d), all BSs in a cluster are connected 
to the MSC using land lines. Each MSC of a cluster is then 
connected to the MSC of other clusters and a Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) main switching 
centre. The MSC stores information about the subscribers 
located within the cluster and is responsible for directing 
calls to them [45]. 
The advantage of these codes is that it will be relative to 
the specific geographical location of a mobile phone; for 
instance, if a user leaves Gwarimpa for Nyanya (two 
different areas in Abuja, Nigeria), the area code would 
change and would identify where the caller resides at the 
time of call. This is also the case for inter-states.              
Genuine privacy issues may not be relevant since, as in 
the current situation, users would be at liberty to either 
activate or de-activate the Caller ID facility [6]. 
    In security related terminologies, this proposal is 
inherently a location-based authentication initiative; though 
it does not comprise all the ingredients of AAA 
(Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting) [26-28].  
However, all the processes of AAA [6] would be a security 
requirement for the operations of special security agencies. 
These security agencies and some designated top 
government functionaries could be permitted by the NCC 
and the network operators, at the instance of necessary 
legislations, to operate special mobile numbers and phones 
that would not reveal these city/area codes.  
      
5. Anticipated challenges 
Every technology evolves with its challenges; this is no 
exception. In this section, the possible challenges that may 
evolve with this proposal are enumerated, with possible 
countermeasures spelled out. 
5.1 Roaming 
 
Most times, the mobile phone user travels abroad for 
conferences, trainings, workshops, businesses, health, etc. 
Most of these users prefer to roam their calling IDs. This 
technology (if operated in Nigeria only) cannot provide the 
city codes of the foreign countries (unless it is adopted there 
or globally). However, except for the case of roaming, the 
proposed city codes provide well-binned space-time 
information of a mobile phone user based on city/area 
codes. The possible effect of roaming on the reliability of 
the proposed system is analysed via a survey in Appendix 
A; with encouraging results.  The survey showed  that, in 
pragmatic terms, about 1.0% of the targeted population 
roam their mobile services, and less than 2.25% of this 
(1.0%) are under the age of 35 (the age range for active 
cyber offenders). Hence, it would be safe to posit that the 
likely negative effect of GSM roaming on the proposed 
LBA as a means of mitigating the incidence of 419 advance 
fee fraud, and related cyber offences in Nigeria, would be 
negligible. 
 
 
5.2  Awareness education 
 
In Nigeria, most users tend to believe that all 
telecommunications caller numbers not starting with the 
trunk prefix (zero) is an international call. This has been 
used to swindle victims more often than not. When this 
proposal is implemented, most users will face the challenge 
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of adjusting to recognize that all numbers not beginning 
with the zero prefix are not foreign numbers. It is hoped that 
a sensitization campaign will be carried out to educate the 
general public about the change using newspapers, radio, 
TV stations, posters, etc. The Government at all levels, 
NCC, Mobile Service Providers (MSPs) and security 
agencies would have an important role to play in this regard. 
5.3 Cloning fraud 
 
This is a high-tech problem that can be perpetrated only by 
some experts who are capable of knowingly, wittingly or 
fraudulently obtaining the factory details of a mobile-phone 
or by monitoring the radio characteristics of a particular 
mobile phone for a long time. Cloning fraud occurs when 
the factory-set Electronic Serial Number (ESN) and 
telephone Mobile Identification Number (MIN) has been 
dubbed and used to programme a different phone so that 
when the legal, as well as illegal (cloned), user places a call, 
the ESN/MIN of the legitimate mobile will be transmitted 
[29, 25]. The transmission of similar ESN/MIN from 
different mobile nodes is already known [29] and described 
as a Sybil attack in, for example, wireless sensor networks 
[31-35], and several solutions have been suggested [36-40]. 
It will be easy to identify the location from which the 
fraudulent user calls when the proposed method is adopted, 
since the city/area codes would be different. This can easily 
isolate the legitimate user from the illegal user. Meanwhile, 
for cell phone cloning fraud, the cellular equipment 
manufacturing industry has deployed authentication systems 
that have proven to be a very effective countermeasure [30]. 
 
5.4 Immunity/Security of special security 
agencies and authorised government 
functionaries  
It may be delicate to always reveal the space-time 
information of a security professional, such as the agents of 
State Security Service (SSS). These security agents and 
some designated top government functionaries could be 
permitted by the NCC and the MSPs, at the instance of 
necessary legislations, to operate special mobile numbers 
and phones that would not reveal these city/area codes.  
 
 
5.5 Man-in-the-middle and rogue base-
station attacks 
 
The man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack involves intercepting 
a call and re-routing it through a third party to the receiver at 
the other end, such that both the original source and the sink 
do not know that the link is compromised. This can be 
tackled by authenticating the Mobile User (MU) and a 
Home e-Node B (HeNB or LTE Femtocell) from a 
contractual proxy-signature already established between the 
HeNB and OAM (Operation, Admission and Maintenance) 
[41]. A rogue base station may lead to a Denial of Service 
(DoS). Meanwhile, DoS due to a rogue base station has been 
discovered and solution proffered in [42] including 
impersonation [43].  
 
 
5.6 Compatibility with future evolutions 
 
LTE-A Rel-10 and beyond, is not a new radio-access 
technology but the evolution of LTE to further improve the 
performance [43]. This evolution inherited all the Rel-8/9 
functionalities with additions such as carrier aggregation, 
enhanced multi-antenna support, improved support for 
heterogeneous deployments, and relaying [43]. The Rel-9 
uses OTDOA for uplink and E-CID (Enhanced-Cell ID) for 
both uplink and downlink [24]. The E-CID positioning 
algorithm, in addition to the serving eNB (in other words the 
radio cell) and the broadcast cell ID which was defined in 
LTE Rel.8, the information such as propagation delay 
calculated from the difference in timing of signal 
transmission and reception and the Angle of Arrival (AoA), 
are utilised to estimate the MU position [21]. For other 
lower standards, the proposed technology would 
comfortably fit in. 
 
5.7 Replacement for other positioning 
algorithms 
 
This algorithm may rather be seen as the primary algorithm 
to which any other possible geographical positioning 
algorithm can be appended. For instance, the use of GPS can 
be added to the city code algorithm. After all, the Rel-9 was 
defined to involve assisted-GPS (A-GPS), OTDOA and E-
CID [24].  
6. Conclusion 
The degree of insecurity occasioned by fraudulent practices 
has been an issue of great concern economically, especially 
as it relates to foreign direct investments and dealings with 
other international partners. Apart from the economic costs 
to the nations and individuals, it has also been an image 
problem for Africa, using Nigeria as a case study, in various 
international fora. This paper examines possible 
technological means of addressing this problem. The 
suggested solutions, though tailored specifically for the 
Nigerian environment, are applicable to all countries with 
similar situations. 
     The paper used the results of surveys involving field trips 
to Nigeria in November 2013 and 2015/2016, among other 
resources, to look at the cyber security problems in Nigeria 
to arrive at some promising solutions. It was realised that 
most previous efforts at countering cyber and other fraud-
related crimes in Nigeria depended mainly on the use of 
legal instruments. It was also realised that the 419 Scam is a 
major contributor to Nigeria’s third position in the world, 
with 5.7% of cybercrime perpetrators. 
     The main technological proposal to tackle this problem is 
to further digitise the GSM country code into city/area codes 
Africa: cyber space security vis a vis computerisation, miniaturisation and location-based authentication 
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which will be transmitted along with caller IDs to reveal the 
location of the caller, as is currently done with fixed 
telephones. Anticipated challenges, which include the 
possible impact of mobile communication roaming on the 
efficacy of the proposed system, as highlighted in Appendix 
A, were found to be negligible.   
Appendix A. Survey: Effect of GSM roaming 
on location based authentication 
 
Two surveys were conducted, with field trips to Nigeria; 
partially in November 2013 and December/January 
2015/2016. The approaches included the use of 
questionnaires, structured interviews and examination of 
official documents; using direct personal contact, email and 
phone calls. The data obtained from the security agencies 
(NP, SFU, NFIU, EFCC and NCC) and individual targets, 
among others, facilitated the discussions on cybersecurity in 
Section 3 and Appendix A [1]. Details of the survey on 
GSM roaming are now presented in this Appendix. 
     Due to the lack of cooperation by the MSPs which 
frustrated the completion of the survey in 2013, it was 
decided that random samples of individuals be used from a 
population of (about 250) Nigerians of all designations from 
all parts of the country and beyond. The data was mainly 
generated using a questionnaire attached to the structured 
interview sample questions for GSM mobile services. The 
results of the survey are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2. 
 
 
Figure A.1. Total and Average Annual Roaming 
Statistics in a Decade 
 
 
A.1 Survey Results Analyses 
 
From Figure A.1, it is obvious that the members of the 
targeted population who roam their mobile services are in 
the region of 10%. Bearing in mind the fact that part of the 
roaming incidence is at the discretion of the MSPs rather 
than the subscribers, personal interactions also 
authenticated that the roaming subscribers are not only less 
than 10% of the population, their actual usage of the 
roamed services is also much less than 10% (i.e., 10% of 
10% = 0.1 x 0.1 = 0.01 = 1.0% of the population); i.e., less 
than 1.0% effective roaming. 
    The above result is not an exaggeration because, in 
practice, most of those who roam their mobile services only 
use them to view calls; to enable them use other cheaper 
facilities to contact their callers in cases of important calls. 
This is due to the factual belief that roamed services are 
extravagantly costly. Figure A.2 illustrates the fact that the 
number of those who roamed their mobile services only 
once in a year is conspicuously much higher than those who 
roamed twice or more. 
 
Figure A.2. Annual Roaming Frequency 
 
    From the above statistics, it cannot be safely posited that 
the incidence of effective roaming is on the rise because, of 
recent, more roaming is done at the instance of the MSPs. It 
is noteworthy, that there were abrupt hikes in the number of 
roaming subscribers in 2014 and 2015. Firstly, these could 
be explained by two possible reasons: Firstly, there were 
more roaming at the instance of the MSPs as a marketing 
strategy to make more money at all costs; secondly, these 
might be connected with the uncertainties associated with 
the general elections earlier scheduled for 14th February 
2015 – it was postponed and later held on 28th March 2015. 
This second reason is informed by the fact that most of the 
roaming within the time frame was concentrated in the last 
quarter of 2014 and first quarter of 2015; with a good 
number of the affected individuals being politicians. 
    From the foregoing, it could be deduced that there 
remained a culture of lukewarm attitude towards roaming 
among Nigerians, throughout the decade under review. It is 
also very impressing to observe that about less than 2.25% 
of the roaming subscribers were under the age of 35; data 
from and discussions with the SFU/EFCC indicate that the 
effective age bracket for most cyber offenders in Nigeria is 
from 20 – 35 years. Thus, it could be concluded that, in 
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pragmatic terms, about 1.0% of the targeted population 
roam their mobile services, and less than 2.25% of this are 
under the age of 35. Hence, it would be safe to posit that the 
likely negative effect of GSM roaming on the proposed 
LBA as a means of mitigating the incidence of 419 advance 
fee fraud, and related cyber offences in Nigeria, would be 
negligible. 
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